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Introduction
After the burst of the bubble economy, Japanese economy has been changed drastically.
Traditionally, Japanese economy was characterized as a bank-centered economy, and capital markets played only a marginal role. Unfortunately, many banks that took too much risk exposures in the late 1980's faced financial difficulties in the 1990's, and some banks actually went into bankruptcy. Failures of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in 1997 and Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan in 1998 were splendid examples. As these banks consisted of the core of Japanese financial society, many firms that heavily financially depended on these failed banks experienced serious financial problems (Yamori and Murakami, 1999) . Furthermore, even banks that survived were seriously lack of capital and reluctant to extend loans to small and medium size enterprises.
As the banking system did not function well, the government concluded that it was necessary to strength the market-based finance, and started to deregulate securities markets and modernize banking regulations in 1996. This extensive reform initiative is called "Financial Big Bang."
Also, accounting and disclosure rules have been revised to make more credible and wider information available to market participants because appropriate disclosure is essential for the market-based finance. Now, Japanese observers agree that the disclosure standard of Japanese firms is far better than before.
If other things be constant, more extensive and timely disclosure should result in more accurate evaluation of firm's risks. However, it may be still very difficult to monitor firms' risks from outside due to the following reasons. First, disclosure regulation may be useless if it does not require firms to disclose really important information. Second, nowadays firms operate more complex businesses whose risks are hard to evaluate. Typical examples are found in banking businesses. Traditionally, banks operated very simple business; raising funds as deposits and lending them to corporations. Now, banks operate internationally and engage in various businesses, such as investment banking and derivative transactions. Therefore, the issue of whether risk evaluation is easier than before is an empirical research question.
Although investigating how effective current disclosure is in evaluating corporate risks is relevant to current regulation, there are only a few papers investigating this issue. This lack of research is mainly because there are not appropriate data sets and methodology to be used for empirical tests. Fortunately, Morgan (2002) proposed a very useful method. That is, he used the disagreement between credit rating companies (i.e., Moody's and Standard and Poor's) over new issued bonds to measure the difficulty in evaluating firms' risks. In this paper, we follow Morgan (2002) and investigate whether credit rating firms agree on the evaluation on Japanese firms' risks more often than before. If there are still large disagreements among credit rating companies, this suggests that the current disclosure is not enough for outsiders to evaluate firms'
creditworthiness. Also, we are interested in what sectors credit ratings companies more often disagree on in terms of risk evaluation. Morgan (2002) pointed out, financial industries, such as banks and insurance companies, are difficult to evaluate. We investigate whether his findings are confirmed by using Japanese data.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the current Japanese economic situation and explain why Japan aimed to shift from bank-based finance to market-based finance.
Also, we briefly explain the accounting and disclosure reform. In Section 3, we explain data and methodology that are used in this paper. In Section 4, empirical results are provided. Section 5 concludes this paper.
The Changing Japanese Economy

The Lost Decade
The Japanese economy, whose nominal GDP for 2002 was 499 trillion yen, is the second largest economy in the world. Although Japan had experienced remarkable economic growth after the Figure 1 , the ratio of loan with Real Estates and Floating
Mortgages as collateral to total bank loans peaked in 1992 (i.e., 28.4%). Furthermore, in the late 1980's (i.e., the bubble period), Japanese banks were eager to provide funds to real estates companies. At that time, Japanese banks felt that they were well secured because of so-called "Land Myth," which means that land values never decline. Banks' high dependency on land values functioned very well so long as land prices continued to rise.
Owing to the deflation in the 1990's, borrowers suffered from the appreciation of real values of debts. As real estate companies had huge land in the portfolio and borrowed huge money from banks, they were vulnerable to land price declines. Unfortunately, the deflationary effect was not limited to the real estate industry. With the prolonged deflation, the number of firms that went into bankruptcy rose to an unprecedented level (e.g. the number of corporate bankruptcies was 19,164 for 2001, three times larger than that for 1990). Japanese financial institutions suffered from huge bad loan problems 1 . Figure 2 shows that bad loans remained large in spite that Japanese banks incurred over five trillion yen losses every year by writing off or selling off The bad loan problems seriously damaged banks and other financial institutions, and some of them went into bankruptcy in the late 1990's. (See Table 1 ). These frequent bank failures were all the more shocking because there was no bank failure for fifty years until 1995. More seriously, even solvent banks were reluctant to extend loans to riskier borrowers, such as small size enterprises. After the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997, severe credit crunches were observed nation-widely. As shown in Figure 3 , bank loans amounted to 493 trillion yen at the end of 1997. Then, bank loans have declined to 413 trillion yen at the end of
2003.
1 When a borrower fails to repay loans, a bank forecloses collaterals and sells them. Japanese banks usually ask borrowers to pledge as collateral that is more worth than the loan amount. Unfortunately, the price of land declined very much, banks often found that collateral values were smaller than loan amounts in the late 1990's. Eventually, although bank sold the collaterals, bank could not cover the default losses. 2 There are several definitions of bad loans in Japan. The figures that we used in this chapter are those of risk monitored assets (Risuku-Kanri-Saiken in Japanese). Spiegel and Yamori (2004a) .
Decreasing Importance of Banks' Roles in Japanese Economy
Japanese banks have played very important roles in Japanese financial system, and a vast amount of studies has been devoted to clarify their roles. It is well-known that Japanese banks keep close long-term relationship with corporate customers. This is called "main-bank" relationship. A main-bank is generally a bank; (1) that provides the largest amount of loans to the firm, and (2) that is a major shareholder of the firm. Furthermore, it is often observed that persons who retired from the main-bank are employed as board members of customer firms.
Several studies demonstrate that as the "main-bank" relationship reduces the costs induced by asymmetric information, it has economic rationale. As the asymmetric information problem is severer when firms face financial distress, the values of main-bank relationship may be easily observed regarding financially distressed firms. For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1990) investigated investment of firms in financial distress and found that firms that belonged
to Keiretsu invested more than independent firms. Gibson (1995 Gibson ( , 1997 , Yamori and Murakami (1999) , Kang and Stulz (2000) and Brewer, et al. (2003) showed that weak main banks had negative effects on corporate customers. Kaplan and Minton (1994) showed that bankers were likely to be appointed as firm' directors when their customer firms were in financial distress. To summarize, previous studies agree that Japanese banks have played active corporate governance roles.
However, the importance of the role of banks has been decreasing as financial deregulation In sum, the government advances the deregulation of capital markets to harmonize Japanese capital markets with international markets 3 . Currently, the usability of Japanese capital markets is improved. Although banks are still important in screening and monitoring small and medium-sized enterprises, capital markets are now expected to play important roles regarding at least large companies finance and corporate governance.
Figure 4. New Issues of Corporate Straight Bond (trillion yen)
(Source) Japan Securities Dealers Associations.
Accounting Reform; Kaikei Big Bang
It is often said that as banks can observe firm's daily transactions through its checking accounts, banks have a lot of private information to assess customer's risks. In the bank-centered economy, as firms borrowed necessary money from banks, they did not take care of conveying their true financial conditions to capital market participants. Therefore, it was natural that Japanese firms were reluctant to disclose their financial condition. In contrast, the quality of the disclosed financial reports is crucial in the market economy. Market participants evaluate firm's creditworthiness based on disclosed documents, such as B/S and P/L. Therefore, disclosure and accounting reform conducted since the late 1990's were badly necessary to help market participants, including credit rating companies, to evaluate the creditworthiness of Japanese firms.
Although the government has conducted wide range disclosure reforms, we explain some (See Table 3 ).
In Japan, the accounting reform is often called "Kaikei Big e. The National Association of Shinkin Banks recommended disclosure by Shinkin banks with deposits exceeding 100 billion yen. However, compliance was not universal.
(Source) Spiegel and Yamori (2004b) .
Credit Rating Companies in Japanese Financial Markets
Credit rating companies are important players in developed financial markets. They evaluate the creditworthiness of bond issuers, based on public information and sometimes on private information that is obtained through interviewing managers. As the evaluation of credit rating companies over bonds are made public, market participants can use the credit grades to judge whether the bond is properly priced. In the developed financial markets, the bond should be priced based on its risks. Of course, as shown in Figure 5 , companies with higher credit grade obtain cheaper funds in recent Japanese market.
Although credit rating companies have more than one century experience in the United States, they have shorter history in Japan. As Japanese companies borrowed from banks and did not issue substantial amount of bonds, there were no needs for credit rating companies for a long time. Credit rating companies are necessary only when many firms consider issuing bonds. At first, when Japanese companies issued foreign bonds, they obtained credit grade from foreign credit rating companies. Then, due to the development of domestic bond markets, domestic credit rating companies were established, and foreign credit rating companies started their operation in Japan. The number of firms that these credit rating companies assign credit ratings is increasing.
According to Japan Credit Rating Agency, 916 firms and organizations had credit rating as of There is another evidence to verify that credit ratings enhanced influence in the late 1990's.
That is, we counted how many articles in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, the most popular business newspaper in Japan, used a word "credit ratings" ( Kakuzuke in Japanese). We found that 773 articles used Kakuzuke during 1980 Kakuzuke during to 1984 Kakuzuke during , 2070 Kakuzuke during during 1985 Kakuzuke during to 1989 Kakuzuke during , 5379 from 1990 Kakuzuke during to 1994 Kakuzuke during , 8906 during 1995 Kakuzuke during to 1999 Kakuzuke during , and 5019 during 2000 Kakuzuke during to 2004 . The number of usage of Kakuzuke during the 1995-99 period is more than ten times larger than that during the 1980-84 period.
Above informal evidences were supported by Bremer and Pettway (2002) , who examined the stock prices of Japanese banks that were subsequently downgraded by Moody's Investors
Services during the 1986-1998 period. The paper found that the market imposed a significant penalty before as well as at the time of downgrades by Moody's. This suggests that the rating company created information that affected shareholders' evaluation. (Source) Japan Securities Dealers Association.
Methodology and Data
Methodology
7 Note that we include data only until September 22, 2004.
As mentioned above, the accounting reform has been advanced and credit rating companies have played more and more important roles in Japanese economy. However, there is a critical question whether credit rating companies appropriately rate the grade. When a credit rating company downgrades Company A, Company A often claims that the downgrade is not justified by the company's true situation 8 . Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the ability of credit rating companies. A standard method is to evaluate the ex-post default probability by credit grade. But we have to wait for a long time to accumulate relevant information.
Therefore, we use another methodology that can be conducted with current data sets.
Concretely, we follow Morgan (2003) , who focuses on disagreement between rating companies over new issue bonds. The basic idea of Morgan (2002) is simple: if firm's risk is harder to observe, the raters in the business of judging risks should disagree more often over firm creditworthiness. Similarly, we assume that the fact that credit rating companies likely agree on the creditworthiness of a firm suggests that credit rating companies make more accurate judgment. If there is one true solvency condition of Company A, the answer about its solvency should be the same among credit rating companies. Both more information and higher ability of credit rating companies should lead to smaller gaps in evaluation among credit rating companies.
Unfortunately, we confess in advance that we can not separate the more-information hypothesis from the higher-ability hypothesis. So, at this stage, we can only document how differently four credit rating companies rate Japanese firms.
The methodology that Morgan (2003) used is as follows. First, he collected credit ratings by Moody's and S&P regarding newly issued bonds during 1983-1993. Second, he mapped the letter ratings of rating agencies, such as AAA, to a single numeric scale in the following manner.
As shown in Table 4 , AAA (or Aaa) is assigned 1, AA+ (Aa1) is 2. So, better letter ratings correspond to lower numbers and vice versa. Third, he calculated basic statistics, such as average scores and rank correlations in order to compare credit ratings assigned by S&P and Moody's. Finally, he found that the disagreement over banks and insurance companies are larger than the disagreement over other industries.
We follow the Morgan's methodology and examine the disagreements among four raters. Note that two Japanese credit rating companies, R&I and JCR, use the same letter ratings as S&P. 
Data Description
As mentioned above, there are four major credit rating companies in Japan. The coverage of firms that four credit rating companies assigned credit rating varies. For our purpose, the firms that are rated by at least two credit rating companies do matter. We call them multi-rated companies. Table 5 shows that the number of multi-rated firms increased from 1996 to 2004. In 10 The current credit ratings are available at the homepages of credit rating companies without any charge, but the old data are not available on homepages.
2004, more than 250 Japanese firms are multi-rated, and (although not shown in the table) 817 firms out of 3700 listed companies have a credit rating from at least one credit rating company. This is consistent with our findings in Section 2.4 that credit ratings have played more and more important roles in Japan. Table 5 also shows average ratings of four credit rating companies. American raters assigned more unfavorable grades to Japanese firms than Japanese raters. For example, there is 0.79 notch difference between S&P's mean grade and JCR's mean grade for 2004. However, this comparison may not be appropriate because each rater evaluated different companies. There are only a few companies that have credit ratings from four rating companies for all four years. One of them is Japan Airlines (JAL). Figure 6 shows the changes of the credit ratings of JAL by four credit rating companies. As of 1996, JCR rated JAL as AA, while S&P rated it as BBB+. Then, all credit rating companies downgraded JAL by four to seven notches. There are two remarkable features. First, the credit ratings of JAL are not converging among four rating companies. Large disagreement remains. Second, although there are a few notch differences among credit ratings, the relative evaluation is stable. That is, S&P's rating is always the lowest and JCR's rating is always the highest among four. Another firm that had four credit grades is Mitsui-Sumitomo Moody's and S&P rated it as AA-(Aa3).
As there are few firms that have credit grades from all four companies, it is impossible to compare four credit rating companies at once. For example, if we use only observations common to four rating companies, the sample for 1996 includes only seven firms. However, there are many companies that have credit grades from two credit rating companies 11 . In this paper, we focus on firms that have grades from two rating companies and investigate disagreement of grades over these firms.
11 It is interesting, but beyond the scope of this chapter, to consider so-called rating shopping.
Usually, firms ask credit rating companies to rate the grade and pay some fees for the rating. However, credit rating companies sometimes announce the rating of firms without firms' request. Furthermore, Moody's does not separate requested credit ratings from non-requested ratings. Therefore, it is technically difficult to analyze the rate shopping issue. 
Results and Interpretation
Whole Industries
In this sub-section, we use all firms to measure the size of disagreement among rating companies. As every rating company rates different firms, we perform one by one comparison (e.g., R&I vs. Moody's). Table 6 shows the results of comparison between two rating companies 12 . 13 . For all four years, S&P assigned more unfavorable grades to Japanese firms than Moody's. Except 1996, the differences are statistically significant. Finally, between R&I and JCR, R&I assigned more unfavorable grades to Japanese firms than JCR. Table 6 shows that domestic rating companies tend to evaluate Japanese firms' creditworthiness more highly than foreign rating companies. Although this tendency is an interesting research topic, this paper does not consider this issue. What is important for this paper is the fact that there remains large disagreement among credit rating companies over Japanese firms' creditworthiness. 
Correlation Analysis
The above results suggest that the absolute level of the credit ratings is different among rating companies. However, if the relative evaluation is similar, the absolute difference may not be crucial. For example, there are three companies, X, Y, and Z. A rating company rated X as AAA, B as AA, and C as A, while another rating companies rated X as AA, Y as A, and Z as BBB. In the sense that they ranked X is the best, Y is middle, and Z is the lowest, the relative creditworthiness evaluation is the same. Here, similarity is measured according to values of correlation coefficients between scores assigned by two rating companies. Namely, we examine simple correlation and rank correlation among credit rating scores 14 . can not draw a definitive final conclusion.
Disagreements by Industry
Generally speaking, some industries may be difficult to evaluate. It is interesting to show the differences in credit ratings by industry. Morgan (2003) Morgan (2002) ascertained that the fact that bank assets are mainly financial assets invites agency problem because risks of loans to small business are hard to observe and trading assets are easy to change. 17 Note that most of Japanese life insurance companies are mutual, not stock companies. As our data source included credit ratings regarding only listed companies, all firms belonging to insurance sector in this chapter are general insurance companies, not life insurance companies.
finance" sector were smaller. He claimed that other finance sector was not so opaque because they favored the asset-backed bonds. The unclear result regarding Japanese non-bank finance may be due to their different asset structures from their U.S. counterparts. Finally, the only result that we can fairly conclude is that public utilities industry (i.e., industry 20) is the easiest to evaluate. 
Disagreement over Bank Creditworthiness
Finally, we scrutinize disagreement over bank creditworthiness, which was actually a main research interest of Morgan (2002) . Investigating Japanese bank case itself is also interesting because of less transparent bank disclosure than U.S. banks and frequent bank failures in the late 1990's. Moody's and S&P seems not to have any clear tendency. Namely, the gap for 2002 is larger than previous years, while the correlation between them for 2002 is the largest. Table 9 . Disagreement over Banks
Conclusion
The Japanese economy has drastically changed since the burst of the bubble, and the role of banks in Japanese economy has decreased. The government wants capital markets to play more important roles and deregulates capital markets. Credit ratings are crucial for capital markets, and we actually observe that credit rating companies enhance their influence. However, there is no research to investigate whether how differently credit rating companies rate firms. Using methodology that Morgan (2002) used, we find that the foreign credit rating companies tend to assign lower grade to Japanese firms than Japanese rating companies. And the differences among raters remain large, in spite of the disclosure and accounting rule reforms. However, when we focus on the correlation between scores of credit ratings, we find that credit rating companies tend to agree more often on the relative risk evaluation. Although we need further examination, we understand that the relative risks become easier to monitor due to the reforms.
We are also interested in investigating what sectors credit ratings more often disagree on.
Similar to Morgan (2002) , we found that the smallest difference existed regarding evaluation on public utilities sectors. Regrettably, we failed to find larger disagreements among credit rating companies over banks and insurance companies.
Although we find several interests facts, we need further research. First, we only document the disagreement among credit raging companies, but we do not consider why they disagree.
Insufficient information, their low ability or less-sophisticated experiences, and credit rating companies' risk preference may matter. Second, to directly compare U.S. market results with our results, we have to use new issue bonds ratings regarding Japanese firms. Third, the rate shopping is an interesting topic. Fourth, as argued in the text, it is interesting to examine the effect of the enhancing role and influence of credit ratings companies on Japanese corporate governance.
